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The practice of knowledge management (KM) continues to grow within the Department 
of Defense; however, while the other services have substantially matured in KM, the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) has not. Most organizations today leverage 
information systems and technology to their advantage for increasing information and 
knowledge flow, and overall KM. The problem is that USMC units do not appear to be 
leveraging knowledge as effectively as they could, and as other services do, to address 
the national knowledge issue and dilemma. The purpose of this research is to identify 
current courses of action that the USMC is taking to mature its KM, to diagnose 
pathologies preventing USMC units from capitalizing on the power of KM, and to 
identify a framework for small-unit level implementation. 
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The practice of knowledge management (KM) continues to grow within the 
Department of Defense (DoD); however, while the other services have substantially 
matured in KM, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has progressed rather slowly. 
Most organizations today leverage information systems and technology (IST) to 
their advantage for increasing information and knowledge flow and overall KM. This 
thesis topic stems from the larger issue of our nation’s decreasing knowledge and the 
negative effects of the cultural characteristics of Generation Y—birth dates from 1980s to 
2000s. The president of the United States (POTUS) acknowledged in National Security 
Strategy 2010 (NSS) that social progress has accelerated to the extent that Americans 
must pursue a strategy of increasing knowledge. The POTUS continues, 
We must educate our children to compete in an age where knowledge is 
capital (NSS, 2010, Introduction, para. 4) .…, and our own prosperity and 
leadership depends increasingly on our ability to provide our citizens with 
the education that they need to succeed. .… The United States has lost 
ground in education, even as our competitiveness depends on educating 
our children to succeed in a global economy based on knowledge and 
innovation. America’s long-term leadership depends on educating and 
producing future scientists and innovators. (NSS, 2010, p. 29) 
Further, as the POTUS said in his State of the Union Address in 2011, 
“revolutions in technology have transformed the way we live, work, and do business” 
(Obama, 2011, p. 2). Other nations are educating their children with greater emphasis on 
math and science and investing in research and new technology to improve their 
knowledge and leadership; however, America’s technological education follows behind 
many other nations, which have greater Internet and World Wide Web (W3) access and 
invest more in educating young people to earn a college degree (Obama, 2011).  
American leadership acknowledges the importance and necessity of investing in 
education and research in technology, but not every organization/unit is prepared to 
leverage IST towards increasing knowledge and improving leadership. In the struggle to 
keep a competitive edge, leaders, teachers, and parents have to dictate, direct, and force-
 2
feed knowledge to the millennials (i.e., Generation Y) through legacy methods. This is 
only one battle in the war to gain knowledge superiority (KS). When an organization 
achieves superb knowledge flow, it will be able to create a niche of competitiveness and 
survive in the long term. In order to respond to opportunities and threats across the globe, 
the millennial generation needs to take the initiative to learn and research the knowledge 
necessary to make them better leaders—which, internalized, will give them and their 
organizations efficiency and overall effectiveness. 
Since it is clear that America needs to get back the competitive advantage, it is 
every citizen’s responsibility to connect every part of America to the technological age of 
information and knowledge flow, thus enhancing the leadership of our country (Obama, 
2011). To inspire millennials to achieve the vision and dedication necessary for 
knowledge superiority is the first step in ensuring we have the warriors necessary to be 
effective and efficient within our elite military organizations, for our nation’s security. 
Finally, the national military strategy (NMS) of the United States recognizes that, 
globally, we are a knowledge-based society and have the ability to share, process, 
analyze, and disseminate information to be efficient and effective (Mullen, 2011). The 
DoD sees information as a strategic asset and wants to ensure that innovative information 
capabilities are available to the warfighter (DoD CIO Vision and Mission, 2013). The 
DoD has taken many steps towards tackling the issue of KM through the use of IST. The 
DoD Research and Engineering Enterprise (DoD R&EE) supports the mission of 
“depend[ing] on science, technology and innovative engineering to not only protect the 
American people but to advance our national interests and to prepare us to meet the 
challenges of an uncertain future” (DoD R&EE, 2013, Mission, para. 1). The Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC) mission repeats this theme: “to provide essential, 
technical research, development, testing and evaluation information rapidly, accurately 
and reliably to support DoD customers’ needs” (DTIC, 2013, DTIC’s Mission 
Statement). These organizations are implementing the precept stated in the 2011 State of 
the Union Address, that “maintaining our leadership in research and technology is crucial 
to America’s success” (p. 4). 
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Johnson (2010), in his thesis, Developing a Knowledge Management Framework 
to Assist With Current USMC Information Management Practices, identifies U.S. Army, 
Navy, and Air Force KM practices and their maturation. Another military organization 
that responds immediately to threats across the globe is the USMC, and this elite military 
organization has yet to mature any KM program or introduce KM programs throughout 
its smaller units. The last piece to fulfilling the direction of the POTUS and the national 
military strategy of the U.S. is for the USMC to leverage and mature the practice of KM 
and implement a framework at the small-unit level. The USMC “understands well the 
value of KM, but has a difficult time integrating its practice into daily operations” 
(Johnson, 2010, p. 1). A community of practice (CoP) is thus desirable, but initiating any 
KM programs, especially at the small-unit level, remains a low priority for the USMC. 
Knowledge needs to be a priority because it is “the preeminent economic resource, more 
important than both raw material and money” (Stewart, 1997, p. 6). Grant (1996) 
emphasizes that a firm’s priority should be to focus upon knowledge as its most 
important strategic asset. 
The purpose of this research is to identify current courses of action (COAs) the 
USMC is taking to mature its KM, diagnose any pathologies preventing USMC units 
from capitalizing on the power of KM, and identify a framework for small-unit-level 
implementation. This thesis commences with existing literature in Chapter II. Chapter III 
focuses on research methodology. Chapter IV diagnoses any pathologies and summarizes 
findings. Chapter V proposes recommendations and key interventions for the USMC to 
adopt and to advance KM.  
 4
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Johnson’s (2010) thesis, Developing a Knowledge Management Framework to 
Assist With Current USMC Information Management Practices, recognizes and addresses 
the problem that the USMC lacks a mature KM framework and rigorous practice. Any 
mention of knowledge is through current doctrine identifying information-management 
(IM) standard operating procedures (SOP). For example, the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 3–40.2 places heavy emphasis on IM, but not KM. Johnson begins 
his thesis by explaining how knowledge is one of the most important factors in an 
organization’s competitive advantage and, citing Tom Stewart (1997), asserts 
“knowledge has become the single most important factor of production, managing 
intellectual assets has become the single most important task of business” (p. 6) in the 
modern economy.  Other resources cited by Johnson (2010) include Grant (1996), to 
demonstrate that knowledge is the “critical input in production and primary source of 
value” (p. 112).  Johnson (2010) explains the various definitions of knowledge and KM 
visions, while piecing together and articulating numerous principles and theories of KM. 
For example, an important concept in understanding KM is knowledge-flow principles 
and Nissen’s (2006) multidimensional knowledge-flow visualization. Understanding the 
common language of KM is an important success factor for any KM initiative (Davenport 
& Prusak, 1998). Johnson’s thesis discusses each service’s perspective and definitions of 
KM through their own publications and analyzes each service through six developed 
propositions. Ultimately, Johnson finds that the USMC has no strong KM initiatives, but 
does consider KM an important concept. Using Minonne and Turner’s (2009) Evaluating 
Knowledge Management Performance Johnson rates the USMC at maturity level two out 
of five. The conclusion to Johnson’s 2010 thesis recommends a “create, craft, choose, 
promote and organize” (p. 62) (C-3PO) framework with KM “best practices and activities 
most likely to bring maturity to current USMC KM practices” (p. 62). 
In order to grasp the extent of the following research and extend Johnson’s 2010 
research, the following outline frames this literature review. First, an analysis of the 
current maturity level of the USMC KM is conducted, with a diagnosis of pathologies 
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that may suggest a different framework or methodology for practicing KM at the unit 
level. A new theory is that the USMC has not substantially matured in any KM practice 
or initiative, and there is no push for KM practice at the unit level. Targeting, evaluating, 
and placing strong emphasis upon current DoD KM best practices and principles will add 
to the strategy of Johnson’s methodology using Yin’s (2009) five components for case-
study research. Additionally, the principles outlined in Nissen’s (2006) Harnessing 
Knowledge Dynamics will also be leveraged to determine any improvement of KM 
practice in the USMC and referred to for possible establishment of a basic unit KM SOP 
doctrine. Finally, IST will be analyzed through the framework provided by Alavi and 
Leidner (2001). As Johnson mentions, Alavi and Leidner introduce “a framework for the 
analysis of the role of an information system in organizational KM processes” (p. 15).  
The following literature review summarizes a variety of materials to avoid redundancy 
with previous research. 
A. EPISTEMOLOGY 
Scientia potentia est (knowledge is power) has been a cliché for centuries. 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) is also a cliché, and also a phrase for 
traditional epistemology. Knowledge itself is an extremely influential tool and arguably 
the most important practice (business or not) for any individual or organization hoping to 
achieve a competitive advantage. Although the intuitive and notional practice of 
obtaining more useful knowledge than the adversary (i.e., the competition) is a human 
instinct, the physical practice or study of knowledge (i.e., epistemology) was not 
introduced into organizations, and organizational research as a capital asset until the 
information revolution took off and knowledge became a necessity for success. Johnson 
(2010) acknowledges this importance for the USMC by reference and assertion that 
“knowledge is the key to achieving competitive advantage” (p. 5). 
Many scholars have elaborated on the intellectual history of the study of 
knowledge from the era of Socrates and Plato (300–400 BC), and through their recent 
contributions in the field of epistemology. Other scholars attribute the beginnings of the 
study of knowledge per se to Sir Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century or John Locke 
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in the eighteenth, due to their pioneering work and impact on epistemology. 
Epistemology is the philosophical aspect of the theory of knowledge and can be dated as 
far back as the Paleolithic age (2.6 million years ago), with the prehistory of human 
technology. The study of knowledge started with the beginning of humankind, 
communicated through drawings (40,000 years ago) and developed into proto-languages, 
petroglyphs, pictograms, ideograms, cuneiform script (c. 3000 BC), the Rosetta stone, 
Sanskrit (1500–1200 BC), woodblock printing, hydraulic semaphore systems (fourth 
century BC), the printing press (1000–1500 AD), modern linguistics, telephony 
(nineteenth century AD), and all the advanced technology developed over the last 
century. 
Epistemology and its historical sources have created a dynamic field of study 
centered on the specific techniques practiced by individuals, groups, and organizations to 
gain a competitive advantage. As seen below, and much like the development of 
communications, the study and theory of knowledge continues to evolve. Cook and 
Brown (1999) are just one example among many authors who have studied epistemology 
and the difference between knowledge and knowing, distinguishing between the 
epistemology of possession (i.e., knowledge) and epistemology of practice (i.e., 
knowing), which will be covered below. Today, another dynamic field of knowledge has 
emerged, that of knowledge management (KM), which encompasses the whole realm of 
advanced sociology and technology. To drill down into the core capabilities of KM, one 
must understand the definition and scope of knowledge. 
B. KNOWLEDGE 
There are many different categories of knowledge in academia, business 
economies, and modern militaries. They include (but are not limited to) communicated 
knowledge, situated knowledge, partial knowledge, scientific knowledge, and 
organizational knowledge. Johnson (2010) cites many authors and delivers a thorough 
definition. He quotes Stewart (1997) that knowledge is “the preeminent economic 
resource, more important than both raw material and money” (p. 7).  He also refers to 
Alavi and Leidner’s (2001) statement that “knowledge is information possessed in the 
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mind of individuals: it is personalized information (which may or may not be new, 
unique, useful, or accurate) related to facts, procedures, concepts, interpretations, ideas, 
observations, and judgments” (p. 3). Again, Grant (1996) adds that knowledge is the 
“critical input in production and primary source of value,” (p. 112) and Davenport and 
Holsapple (2006) assert that knowledge is the capacity to take action.  Plato defines 
knowledge as “justified, true belief” (Morey, Maybury & Thuraisingham, 2002). Stewart 
(1997) adds that knowledge is often more important than money, and “considered as an 
economic output, information and knowledge are more important than automobiles, oil, 
steel, or any of the products of the Industrial Age” (p. 7). 
Overall, there are many variations and ideologies about what knowledge is or is 
not. The general consensus is that knowledge supports and enables a competitive 
advantage among individuals, groups, and organizations. Many academic and business 
professionals have their own knowledge taxonomies, but within the KM culture the 
fundamental definition of knowledge remains distinct. Jennex and Croasdell (2005) assert 
that the most commonly used taxonomy is from Polanyi’s (1964, 1967) and Nonaka’s 
(1994) definitions of explicit and tacit knowledge. Schwartz’s (2006) Encyclopedia of 
Knowledge Management states the two categories of knowledge are tacit and explicit, 
which have a dynamic interaction, like analog-to-digital synthesizing.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the interaction between these knowledge types. 
1. Explicit Knowledge 
“Explicit knowledge” is data and information codified and put into context as 
“symbolic representations such as words and numbers that can be readily transferred 
among persons in formal, systematic ways” to enable action (Davenport & Hosapple, 
2006, p. 811). Additionally, explicit “knowledge is more actionable than information or 
data is, but actionability does not imply a separate judgment such as better; … and 
knowledge often requires data to enable action” (Nissen, 2006, p. 20). 
2. Tacit Knowledge 
“Tacit knowledge” is simply understood as that which is commonly experienced; 
however, “it is deeply rooted in an individual’s actions and experience as well as in the 
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ideals, values, or emotions he/she embraces,” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8) forcing it 
to be “highly personal and hard to formalize, making it difficult to communicate or share 
with others” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998, p. 42). Two dimensions of tacit knowledge 
Nonaka and Konno (1998) refer to are: 
 Technical dimension of tacit knowledge: “The informal personal skills or 
crafts often referred to as ‘know-how.’” (Schwartz & IGI Global, 2006, p. 
811) 
 Cognitive dimension of tacit knowledge: “Beliefs, ideals, values, 
schemata, and mental models which are deeply ingrained in us and which 
we often take for granted. It shapes the way we view the world.” 
(Schwartz & IGI Global, 2006, p. 811) 
 
Figure 1.  Dynamic Knowledge Interaction (From APO, 2013) 
C. KNOWLEDGE HIERARCHY 
In order to thoroughly grasp and understand the importance of knowledge and 
why it lies at the top of most valued organizational capital, a knowledge distinction needs 
to be presented through a hierarchy of data, information, and knowledge. The knowledge 
hierarchy in Figure 2 explains a broadly accepted view. 
 10
 
Figure 2.  Knowledge Hierarchy (From Nissen, Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000) 
Johnson (2010) explains that Tuomi’s (1999) view of the knowledge hierarchy 
suggests that knowledge is superior to data and information; however, Nissen (2006) 
points out that directionality can occur both ways, as illustrated in Figure 3, keeping in 
mind that the “interrelationships between knowledge, information, and data are more 
complex than implied by a simple three-layer diagram” (Nissen, 2006, p. 20). 
 
Figure 3.  Knowledge Flow Directionality (From Nissen, 2002a) 
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Nissen’s (2002a) inverted view of the hierarchy of knowledge reasons that many 
professions call upon knowledge to produce information, which information is necessary 
for data conveyed through signals. Nissen (2006) describes the producer/source view 
with an analogy of how an attorney uses knowledge to persuade jurors, using 
experienced-based knowledge to ascribe meaning to the information presented (e.g., 
evidence and witness testimony). This information is presented through signals 
(analogical and/or digital), which are symbols through script, words spoken, or visual 
appearances (Nissen, 2006). An opposing view that supports Tuomi (1999) flips this 
hierarchal analogy of the attorney. A juror hears and sees signals from attorney 
arguments, which are placed into contextual information. The information presented 
forces the juror to act by way of rendering a verdict, and the verdict is a result of juror 
knowledge (Nissen, 2006). 
Applying the knowledge hierarchy to a military viewpoint, raw datum is 
constantly being collected for processing into information for critical (i.e., life 
threatening) decision-making capabilities. Only after the correct information is analyzed 
and acted upon is knowledge introduced into leadership decision-making capabilities and 
the development of situational awareness. The consistent hierarchal view of knowledge 
among civilian and military professionals adds to the importance of knowledge and of 
obtaining a competitive advantage. Figure 4 illustrates the USMC’s information-flow 
concept of how data is processed into information for commander critical-information 
requirements (CCIR), and then stored as knowledge for critical decision-making 
capabilities. The important point is that “knowledge involves more than just information: 
It enables direct action (e.g., good decisions, appropriate behaviors, useful work—
judgment and norms determine what constitutes good, appropriate, and useful)” (Nissen, 
2006, p. 16). The directionality of the knowledge hierarchy relates to how “different 
kinds of knowledge (e.g., language, contextual) are required for different kinds of action 
(e.g., interpretation, informing)” (Nissen, 2006, p. 18). Understanding the knowledge 
hierarchy and its directionality precedes a fundamental discussion of knowledge flow. 
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Figure 4.  USMC Information Flow (From MCWP 3–40.2, 2002) 
D. KNOWLEDGE FLOW 
The flow of knowledge in any organization is arguably the most important and 
fundamental requirement for achieving a competitive advantage. Using Newton’s law of 
physics, Nissen (2006) emphasizes that “knowledge at rest tends to stay at rest” (p. 32).  
The reason KF is so critical is that it “depends upon the people, not the technologies,” 
(Nissen, 2006, p. 24) and people can be difficult to persuade to share their experience for 
fear they will lose their individual competitive advantage within an organization. In order 
to successfully obtain knowledge flow within any organization, four processes— 
socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization (SECI)—must occur. 
Johnson (2010) refers to Nonaka’s (1991) model in The Spiral of Knowledge depicting 
these four KF processes and their related dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  SECI Model (From Nonaka, 1991) 
The tacit-to-tacit dimension modeled in Figure 5 relates to socialization through 
social interaction and face-to-face sharing of knowledge through experiences. Since tacit 
knowledge is difficult to codify, it usually requires socialization in the form of meetings, 
brainstorming, and group training. Traditional on-the-job training (OJT) leverages tacit 
KF through hands-on experience instead of learning through explicit knowledge. The 
tacit-to-explicit dimension relates to externalization, where tacit knowledge is captured 
and codified, allowing more knowledge to flow through a medium (e.g., books, manuals, 
publications, images, documentaries). Where knowledge tends to increase in complexity 
and creativity is through explicit-to-explicit KF. This dimension is referred to as 
combination, and the technology to support such combinations of explicit knowledge is 
more prevalent. Finally, internalization refers to explicit-to-tacit KF. This is learning by 
doing, where the individual or group collectively analyzes patterns, ideas, and principles 
for reflection and builds on individual or group tacit knowledge. Familiar KF processes 
that can be related through the SECI model are learning and doing through training 
exercises, education, trial and error, etc.  “Learning refers to knowledge in motion,” while 
“doing refers to knowledge-based work” (Nissen, 2006, pp. 73-78). 
Knowledge-based action is different than knowledge that enables action, and the 
term “Knowing refers to knowledge in action” (Nissen, 2006, p. 70). Simply put, you may 
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know how to do something versus just knowing something (see Cook & Brown’s 
epistemology of practice vs. epistemology of possession). The SECI model evolves in a 
spiral where new knowledge is created, existing knowledge is expanded upon, and explicit 
and tacit knowledge flows. Knowing and knowledge are complementary.  “The action of 
knowing cannot obtain without the enabling knowledge; and the enabling knowledge cannot 
be put to use except through the action of knowing” (Nissen, 2006, p. 71). 
Another important aspect that correlates to knowledge-based action is workflow 
(WF) interactions. The activity of research clearly describes the interaction between the 
flow of knowledge and of work. As Nissen (2006) points out, “there is learning as well as 
doing taking place” (p. 39) as new knowledge is developed through this learning and 
doing activity. Keep in mind that there are several WF processes that concentrate only on 
doing and not learning (e.g., flipping hamburgers), and “people must know what do to 
and how to do it before they can effectively accomplish a knowledge-based activity” (i.e., 
task or mission) (Nissen, 2006, p. 45). Understanding KF and WF processes and related 
knowledge-based activities in the SECI model presents a multidimensional knowledge-
flow visualization (MDKFV) developed by (Nissen, 2005). Figure 6 incorporates life 
cycle and flow time to add to the complexities of KF, and providing a thorough visual aid 
in KF analysis. 
 
Figure 6.  Multidimensional Knowledge-Flow Visualization (From Nissen, 2005) 
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The MDKFV serves many purposes for analyzing KF and covers the whole 
spectrum of KF. A more thorough discussion and description on the MDKFV can be 
found in Nissen (2006) and Johnson (2010). The big takeaway is that the MDKFV is a 
visual aid after breaking down KF patterns within an organization to identify critical 
capabilities and diagnose any pathologies in regard to knowledge flows. This diagram 
will be used to analyze USMC components and capabilities within its current KM 
maturity level. 
As Nissen (2006) points out, organizational leadership has many obstacles and 
diversions restricting knowledge flows. Ultimately, “a person [or organization] must be 
competent at learning before knowledge creation can take place, … a person [or 
organization] must have internalized knowledge before it can be applied,” (Nissen, 2006, 
p. 43) and where knowledge does flow, learning will finally take place. 
E. KNOWLEDGE TECHNOLOGY 
Today, almost all business processes involve IT and rely upon an IT infrastructure 
and architecture to bring a competitive response or advantage to an organization or 
enterprise. Not only is knowledge a critical capability and considered the most important 
form of capital or asset any organization can have; technology is also a strong core 
capability to create effectiveness and efficiencies through a synergy of technologies. 
Long gone are the days of “snail mail,” typewriters, and pads of paper for storing 
knowledge. Although these were once important for the transfer and flow of knowledge, 
innovation continuously evolves as faster and faster hardware, software, systems, and 
networks are invented to deliver and share data, information, and knowledge, slashing 
life cycle and flow time. Within the knowledge life cycle are two roles that clarify the 
supporting nature of IT. Adapted from Nissen (2006), Figure 7 illustrates two roles (i.e., 
classes) to distinguish among extant technologies and show the importance of reliance on 
persons for knowledge to flow. 
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Figure 7.  Knowledge Life Cycle (After Nissen et al., 2000) 
Nissen (2006) points out that the two classes of knowledge are of a localized and 
expanded view. The localized view is supportive in nature, meaning that legacy 
technologies organize, formalize, and share knowledge—indicating support for KF. The 
expanded view is performative in nature, meaning that technologies effect the creation, 
refinement, and application of KF activities. Again, knowledge flows depend upon people, 
not technologies, and there are not many performative technologies (Nissen, 2006). 
Simulation or expert-systems technologies are probably the only argument to a legacy 
technology that performs through “facilitating learning as well as doing through virtual 
practice” (Nissen, 2006, p. 68). Furthermore, these systems have proven over time that they 
can perform better than people (in some, relatively narrow circumstances) by taking 
explicit knowledge and turning it into action. This demonstrates that the capacity to 
increase novice performance levels to that of experts, with an understanding of this 
knowledge technology, is a powerful contributor to competitive advantage (Nissen, 2006). 
Understanding and adapting new technologies to sustain a competitive response 
or to gain a competitive advantage is not as easy as it seems. Organizations study their 
environment, formulate strategies, and create structure under an operating model just to 
obtain a sense of what specific business processes can be leveraged to facilitate KM. 
According to Alavi and Leidner (2001), “in order to formulate a knowledge-management 
strategy, organizations need to assess and understand their knowledge position and 
existing intellectual resources before they can assess the role of information technology 
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in facilitating knowledge management” (Johnson, 2010, p. 17). A class of information 
systems that can manage organizational knowledge is referred to as a knowledge-
management system (KMS). KMSs are “IT-based systems developed to support and 
enhance the organizational processes of knowledge creation, storage/retrieval, transfer, 
and application” (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 7). Alavi and Leidner (2001) propose there is 
a sociology of knowledge within an organization that is considered to be a “knowledge 
system,” and this organizational process is a framework for information technologies in 
organizational management. Table 1 summarizes this framework to further explain 
categories of KMSs. 
 
Table 1.     Knowledge Management Processes and the Potential Role of IT 
(After Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Johnson, 2010) 
Johnson (2010) provides a thorough explanation of Alavi and Leidner’s (2001) 
framework. Essentially, knowledge creation is exactly that: the creation of new 
knowledge or the replacement of existing explicit or tacit knowledge. Knowledge 
storage/retrieval is knowledge that resides in many codified forms. Knowledge transfer 
simply is KF, and knowledge application stems from the individual or organizational use 
of knowledge. Examples of each are provided in Johnson (2010). The point illustrated is 
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that Alavi and Leidner’s (2001) framework correlates to Nissen’s (2006) knowledge life 
cycle, and knowledge technology is another important component of KM. 
F. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
Understanding the definition and types of knowledge that exist, where knowledge 
lies in the hierarchy of data and information, how knowledge flows among individuals 
and organizations, and what technologies support knowledge flows, all contribute to the 
best business practice of KM. So what exactly is KM?  Jennex (2007) established a 
working definition of KM as: 
KM is the practice of selectively applying knowledge from previous 
experiences of decision making to current and future decision-making 
activities with the express purpose of improving the organization’s 
effectiveness. 
Jennex (2007) clarifies that this definition does not include the aspect that once 
KM is implemented, organizational effectiveness and efficiencies will immediately 
improve by putting knowledge into action. Reinhardt (2000) emphasizes there is no 
single perspective that clearly defines KM, since there are both theoretical and practical 
perspectives (Morey, Maybury & Thuraisingham, 2000, p. 192). The theoretical 
perspective of KM is based on the following framework: 
 Four different system levels of learning: individual, team, organizational, 
and interorganizational (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). 
 Three different learning modes: cognitive, cultural and action perspective 
(Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). 
 Three different learning types: single-loop, double-loop and deuteron-
learning (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). 
 Four different learning phases: identification/creation, diffusion, 
integration/modification, and action (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). 
Figure 8 illustrates this framework. 
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Figure 8.  Integrative Perspective on Organizational Learning Concepts (From 
Reinhardt, 2000, p.190) 
The figure and framework in Figure 8 are the product of findings from extensive 
literary research. These are four fundamental core perspectives on organizational learning 
and KM (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 190), and are considered a major theoretical development. 
The other major development from this integrative framework is that KM is understood 
to be a goal-oriented process (Pawlowsky, 2001; Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). Additionally, 
this integrative perspective/framework supports an “understanding of the complexity of 
organizational learning and knowledge management processes,” (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 
192) but is also necessary for successful organizational KM implementation. Building 
upon a theoretical framework, the more practical perspective of KM adds the managerial 
perspective to the process of organizational learning (Reinhardt, 2000, p. 193). Figure 9 
illustrates the core elements of KM previously mentioned and the integration of theory 
and practice. A more in-depth description can be found in Morey et al., (2000), 
Knowledge Management: Classic and Contemporary Works. 
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Figure 9.  The Practical Perspective of Knowledge Management 
(From Reinhardt, 2000, p. 193) 
The practical perspective of KM includes a gamut of fundamental managerial 
skills not limited to creating a vision and mission, setting goals, performance 
measurements, and cost analyses. Another large piece of KM rests within research and 
development (R&D) departments. Not every organization has an R&D department; 
however, groups of individuals working on any task can be organized to retrieve valuable 
explicit knowledge for decision making or improving business processes. KM can occur 
at the smallest entity in global organizations. Take the DoD for example: most KM 
occurs at headquarters level or higher, and only among certain services or specific units. 
But KM not only can be adopted and practiced at a smaller-unit level (e.g., in a regiment 
or battalion), knowledge can be managed at the fire team or squad level to also achieve a 
competitive advantage—in this case, against an adversary. 
The discussion of KM theory and practical application is endless. Researching 
hundreds (among thousands) of papers reveals the same authors referenced over and over 
by other well-known KM theorists and practitioners. The Electronic Journal of 
Knowledge Management, Volume 11, Issue 2, 2013, addresses this very subject. 
Maasdorp (2007) and Stacey (2001) clarify that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) original 
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theory has dominated as the basis for KM theory (Virtanen, 2013). To exaggerate this 
point, take the following definitions of KM: 
 Alavi and Leidner (1999) define KM as a “systemic and organizationally 
specified process for acquiring, organizing, and communicating both tacit 
and explicit knowledge” (p. 6; Virtanen, 2013, p. 119) 
 Snowden (2002) defines KM as “The identification, optimization, and 
active management of intellectual assets, either in the form of explicit 
knowledge held in artifacts or as tacit knowledge possessed by individuals 
or communities” (p. 63; Virtanen, 2013, p. 119) 
 Capeda-Carrion (2006) states KM to be “the formalized, integrated 
approach of managing an enterprise’s articulated and tacit knowledge 
assets” (p. 34; Virtanen, 2013, p. 119) 
From the above definitions and frameworks described, there are hundreds of 
“distinct perspectives or models of organizational learning and knowledge management, 
… and managers [leaders] cannot expect the universal blueprint of implementing 
knowledge management with regard to improving the performance of a firm [unit]” 
(Reinhardt, 2000, p. 192). KM continues to evolve with improved or newly developed 
frameworks, due to the spread, trend, and advantages organizations obtain or adapt. 
Keeping in mind that every organization is tailored differently depending upon its goals 
and implementation of KM, the more KM is implemented and practiced, the more 
practitioners and scholars are able to analyze overall organizational performance to assess 
and understand the true benefits KM as to offer. Currently, this is the case for all armed 
services within the DoD, except the USMC. 
G. KM WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The National Defense Strategy of 2008 acknowledges that the DoD must “break 
down barriers and transform industrial-era organizational structures into an information 
and knowledge-based enterprise” (p. 20). Johnson (2008) points out that a 
“transformation to a net-centric force requires ‘fundamental changes in processes, policy, 
and culture,’ all of which KM boasts significant abilities to achieve” (p. 33).  The quest to 
implement KM CoPs throughout the DoD began around 2008, when the DoD CIO 
defined KM in the DoD IM/IT Strategic Plan of 2008–2009 as “the systematic process of 
discovering, selecting, organizing, distilling, sharing, developing and using 
 information, … providing the basis from which decisions are made and actions are 
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taken” (Johnson, 2010, p. 35). The Department of Defense Information Enterprise: 
Strategic Plan 2010–2012 emphasizes that KM is a necessity and discusses the growing 
“premise that rapidly sharing knowledge of people and organizations at all levels 
provides a vital augmentation to traditional, rigid, centrally-approved knowledge sharing 
approaches” (DoD CIO, 2012, Forward, p. IV). 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) defines KM “as the integration of people and 
processes, enabled by technology, to facilitate the exchange of operationally relevant 
information and expertise to increase organizational performance” (Wennergren, 2005, p. 
1). The U.S. Army defines KM in Army Regulation 25–1 (2013) as an: 
Armywide strategy to transform the Army into a network-centric and 
knowledge-based force to improve information dominance by our 
Warfighters and business stewards. It includes, but is not limited to, 
improving processes, technology, and work culture to collaborate, catalog, 
store, find, and retrieve information; and share this information with Joint, 
coalition, and international partners as mission needs dictate. (Odierno & 
O’Keefe, 2013, p. 74) 
Additionally, the U.S. Air Force defines KM in Air Force Policy Directive 33–3, 
28 March 2006, as: 
The handling, directing, governing, or controlling of natural knowledge 
processes (acquire/validate, produce, transfer/integrate knowledge) within 
an organization in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the 
organization (JP 6–0). KM seeks to make the best use of the knowledge 
that is available to an organization, creating new knowledge, and 
increasing awareness and understanding in the process. KM can also be 
defined as the capturing, organizing, and storing of knowledge and 
experiences of individual workers and groups within an organization and 
making this information available to others in the organization.  (Peterson 
& Shade, 2006, p. 9) 
While the USMC has no official publication or doctrine that specifically defines 
KM, this thesis will highlight the most current initiatives, as representing current 
doctrine. Since the USMC partners with DoN’s information-management initiatives and 
regulations, it is logical that they share the same definition and understanding of KM. All 
services acknowledge that they understand KM, and most have initiatives and CoPs in 
place. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) vision is: 
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To provide quality information services to meet the total information 
needs of our customers. Support the goals of the Coast Guard through 
continuing improvement, innovation, and technological growth using 
knowledge management principles.  (CG-61, 2013, Vision)    
Other organizations within the DoD have CoPs; for example, the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU’s) Knowledge Management and Information Technology: 
Know-IT Encyclopedia states knowledge is “The ideas, understanding, and lessons that 
an organization has learned over time … knowledge is condensed information with 
context that has value for decision and action” (Pollock, 2002, p. 220). 
We clearly see that the DoD and services understand the importance of KM, and 
for the most part are starting to talk the talk; however, depending on operational 
commitments, the maturity level of KM within the services differs drastically. In 2010, 
Johnson summarized examples of KM initiatives throughout the DoD, as shown in Table 
2 below. Table 3 illustrates a timeline of on how the Air Force and Army have evolved in 
KM, and Table 4 provides maturity levels. 
 










Table 4.   Stages of Implementation and Control Maturity 
(From Minonne & Turner, 2009) 
Using the Minonne and Turner (2009) maturity model, Johnson (2010) rated the 
Air Force, Army, and Navy at five, while the USMC was rated at two. These ratings are 
quite significant. The priority and implementation of KM within the USMC may be high, 
but there clearly are other significant factors preventing a higher maturity rating (e.g., the 
war in Afghanistan). Overall, KM within the DoD is strong among most services, and 
continues to evolve. Before a more thorough evaluation is conducted within each service, 
KM initiatives need to expand to test new ground. The DoD KM findings from Johnson 
(2010) are listed in Table 5. 
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 Air Force Army Marine 
Corps 
Navy 
KM Defined Yes -AFPD33.3 
28 Mar 2006 
Yes - Army 
Regulation (AR) 25–1 
15 Jul 2005 
Yes – MCO 
5400.52 
5 Jan 2010 
Yes – DoN Memo 
20 Oct 2005 
KM Perceived 
Important 
Yes – KM goals 
outlined 
Yes – KM 
goals/benefits outlined 
Yes – KM benefits 
outlined 
Yes – KM goals 
outlined 
Indicators and 





















Link to industry value 








Multiple channels for 
knowledge transfer 
KM Maturity Level Mature Mature Novice Mature 
KM Strategy Yes Yes No Yes 
KM Framework For 
Implementation 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Table 5.   DoD KM Findings (From Johnson, 2010) 
Among all the services and findings, Johnson’s thesis research at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) found that “KM has the capability to make the USMC 
business and decision-making processes better;” however, USMC KM initiatives may 
“appear to remain unit specific, as opposed to organizationally formalized” (Johnson, 
2010, p. 26). In his conclusion, he recommended that a create, craft, choose, promote, and 
organize (C-3PO) framework (Figure 10) be implemented for the USMC to mature in 
KM practices, and a strength–weakness–opportunity–threat (SWOT) analysis be 
performed to tailor KM efforts to operational commitments within the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (Johnson, 2010). Finally, he recommends creating a strong 
vision, promoting knowledge sharing, and organizing KM processes around strategy, all 
of which should have been implemented or tested to bring all the USMC’s headquarters- 
and unit-level programs, KM-offered education, and KM methodology to a maturity level 
of five. The next section will cover a methodology to diagnose any pathologies and 












The methodology of this research is modeled after Johnson’s thesis, Developing a 
Knowledge Management Framework to Assist With Current USMC Information 
Management Practices (2010). As with a controlled variable in an experiment, retention 
of the previous case study’s methodology allows further and secondary research to be 
conducted more accurately and conclusively. Secondary research is widely used for 
adding to data collections. The secondary research in this thesis applies Yin’s (2009) 
case-study methodology and Johnson’s (2010) research on KM in the USMC. 
A case-study methodology is an appropriate choice because KM is contemporary 
in nature and currently practiced in the USMC; this empirical inquiry, however, will tend 
toward a more theoretical perspective. As Yin (2009) points out, “a case study is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (p. 634). While Johnson’s (2010) case-study method was intended to 
contribute to the knowledge of organizational KM at the service and unit levels of the 
DoD, the case study in this thesis is focused solely on the USMC and possible KM at its 
small-unit levels. Throughout the analysis, any identified KM best business practice from 
any CoP (e.g., DoD or academia) will be thoroughly evaluated as a candidate for possible 
additional research. The case study presented is also “exploratory, developing hypotheses 
and propositions” (Johnson, 2010, p. 29) similar to Johnson’s (2010) thesis, but changing 
the questions to reflect KM in the USMC only.   Areas of analysis are critiqued for the 
possible addition of leadership mandates, which serve to add a best business practice the 
USMC excels in: developing leaders and leading Marines. 
A. COMPONENTS OF CASE-STUDY RESEARCH 
Yin’s (2009) case-study research employs five necessary components, as Johnson 
(2010) points out: “1) a study’s questions; 2) its propositions, if any; 3) its unit(s) of 
analysis; 4) the logic linking the data to the propositions [a general strategy]; and 5) the 
criteria for interpreting the findings [analytic technique]” (p. 29). 
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Two questions were formulated for the research in this thesis: 
 What are the USMC’s current efforts and COAs for maturing in a KM 
CoP at a headquarters level?  
 What pathologies are impeding KM programs or projects at the 
headquarters or small-unit level?   
The exploratory nature of the first question is focused on extant research of KM 
throughout the USMC, while the second question tailors this case study by analyzing past 
and current USMC KM initiatives. Both these questions add to theoretical observations 
and findings on the current maturity level of KM in the USMC and on factors in success 
or failure. Additionally, they support the possible identification of a framework for small-
unit-level implementation. 
Following component two of Yin’s Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 
Johnson’s (2010) investigative questions led to the development of six specific 
propositions tailored to KM in the DoD. Yin (2009) states, “the first and most preferred 
strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to your case study” (p. 2657).  
The development of the propositions in this case study stems from the original objectives 
and design of Johnson’s (2010) study and, based on these propositions, presents a set of 
research questions, literature reviews, and new hypotheses or propositions (Yin, 2009). 
The propositions in this research are focused specifically towards the USMC.  
 Proposition 1: KM in the USMC is a critical capital asset for a competitive 
advantage. 
 Proposition 2: KM can support any strategic, operational, or tactical 
discipline. 
 Proposition 3: KM can mature in the USMC through the acceptance and 
direction of an SOP and CoPs at both headquarters and small-unit levels.  
The research builds upon these propositions (Johnson, 2010) and shapes data 
collection accordingly, yielding a relevant analytical strategy (Yin, 2009). Additionally, 
these propositions are of a “theoretical orientation guiding the case study analysis,” and 
“focus attention on certain data” (Yin, 2009, p. 2668). 
The third component [described by Yin,] units of analysis, is, for the purposes of 
this research, USMC headquarters and small-unit-level KM initiatives. Yin’s fourth 
component, linkage of logic to data, is conducted by using Yin’s embedded single-case 
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study design. This is different from Johnson’s (2010) embedded multiple-case design 
because Johnson utilized pattern matching from across the DoD, whereas this single-case 
design is focused on one service. 
The fifth component is the actual analytical technique employed. This study will 
methodically use explanation building and organizational-level logic modeling to analyze 
theoretically significant propositions. Johnson (2010) used logic modeling and pattern 
matching, which was valuable in comparing and contrasting KM among all the services 
in the DoD. Explanation building in this thesis compares the findings of Johnson’s initial 
USMC case evaluation against revised propositions, a technique Yin (2009) identifies as 
iterative explanation building. Logic models, which are also employed in this research, 
are defined by Yin as “an analytic technique… [that] consists of matching empirically 
observed events to theoretically predicted events” (Yin, 2009, p. 3053). The strength of 
this study lies in comparing KM in the USMC from 2010 to the present and identifying 
room for improvement and future iterative research. 
B. QUALITY AND RELIABILITY METRICS 
To keep the integrity of secondary research on Johnson’s (2010) thesis, quality 
and reliability metrics need to be similar. These metrics are four tests “common to any 
empirical social research along with the associated tactics necessary at each phase of 
research to ensure success” (Johnson, 2010, p. 31). Ideally, a validity test is first 
constructed [check] to “identify correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied” (Yin, 2009, p. 1060). The research will have validity based upon multiple 
sources of evidence through an established chain of events of data collection. Internal 
validity testing seeks “to establish a causal relationship, whereby, certain conditions are 
believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 
2009, p. 1062). This is accomplished through explanation building and logic modeling 
during the data-analysis phase. The same concern applies to internal validity. Johnson’s 
(2010) research cautions against “incorrect inferences being made from events not 
directly observed;” (p. 31) however, this caveat may not apply to the nonexistent or 
novice KM at the USMC small-unit level. Using this single-case study as a research 
design, the external validity test defines “the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
 32
generalized” (Yin, 2009, p. 1064). The single-case study, combined with iterative 
explanation building, will ensure that findings are generalized. Finally, a reliability test 
demonstrates that “the operations of a study—such as the data collection procedures—
can be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 2009, p. 1065), and a collection database 
minimizes errors and prevents bias. 
Tests Case Study Tactic 




 Use multiple sources of evidence 
 Establish chain of evidence 
 Have key informants review draft case 
study report 
 Data Collection 
 Data Collection 
 Data Collection 
Internal 
Validity 
 Do explanation building 
 Use organizational-level logic models 
 Data Analysis 
 Data Analysis 
External 
Validity 
 Use theory in single-case studies 
 Use iterative explanation building in 
single-case studies 
 Research Design 
 Research Design 
Reliability  Use case study protocol 
 Develop case-study database 
 Data collection 
 Data collection 
Table 6.   Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (After Johnson, 2010) 
C. RESEARCH BIASES AND LIMITATIONS 
As Johnson (2010) points out regarding his own study, “the major bias is that the 
investigator is a member of the United States Marine Corps” (p. 32). The same holds true 
for this investigator; however, an advantage is that the investigator already has some 
knowledge obtained about the organization and its functions in collecting data for a 
thorough analysis. A significant limitation is the absence of a universally accepted 
definition of KM (Johnson, 2010). But this limitation is only salient if extending research 
outside the DoD. As indicated, each service has a universally accepted definition within 
its ranks, and these are similar. Depending upon a service’s mission requirements and 
capabilities, KM practices will vary; but the fundamental theoretical perspectives still 
apply. Another limitation is that no survey or interview data is collected from current 
USMC KM practitioners. The components of USMC KM analyzed are the most current, 
however, mitigating the necessity of first-hand interaction. Finally, it is assumed that all 
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of Johnson’s (2010) research is accurate as a basis for secondary research. Any 
information deemed inaccurate will be acknowledged and remedied. 
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In setting the scene for the diagnosis of pathologies, the author must present the 
intentions of the Marine Corps’ top leader to clarify his direction for the future.  
Additionally, the author will present key indicators (e.g., information systems and 
doctrine) to support this analysis.  As illustrated in Figure 11, the commandant of the 
Marine Corps (CMC) has outlined four priorities in the 35th CMC Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance for the Marine Corps’ way forward, all of which align with the 
capabilities and components of KM. 
 
Figure 11.  Priorities of the CMC (From Amos, 2010) 
The USMC’s Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007) emphasizes that, “To remain the 
nation’s force in readiness, the Marine Corps must continuously innovate. This requires 
that we look across the entire institution and identify areas that need improvement and 
effect positive change” (Conway, 2007, p. 19). These priorities and the USMC’s Vision 
and Strategy for 2025 (2007) illustrate the need for a more mature KM CoP. Each 
priority identifies an important aspect and element for a KM program. The first priority 
stresses that every Marine be prepared to succeed in any type of mission, and in any 
complex or dynamic environment (Amos, 2010, p. 10). Marines must learn and know 
how to accomplish tasks and missions successfully. The next priority highlights changes 
in the manpower environment, which forces the need to improve education and training 
processes within a cohesive unit (Amos, 2010). Knowledge must flow in order to transfer 
both explicit and tacit knowledge, because “knowledge at rest tends to stay at rest” 
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(Nissen, 2006, p. 32). The third priority adds to the first and second by emphasizing the 
dramatic increase in investment in education, which reflects complex information warfare 
(IW) and hybrid environments (Amos, 2010). Again, Marines must learn and know exactly 
how to accomplish tasks and missions successfully. Finally, enhancing morale to ensure 
effectiveness and efficacy in “mentoring and retaining the most talented men and women 
who bring a diversity of background, culture, and skill in service to our nation” (Amos, 
2010, p. 10) is a priority. This priority again emphasizes another area in the quest to retain 
experience (i.e., knowledge), which could be realized through a solid KM program. 
Furthermore, each priority is broken down in more detail in the Commandant’s Planning 
Guidance to clarify these requirements. The Commandant’s Planning Guidance is the 
progenitor of the Marine Corps’ vision and strategy, as illustrated in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12.  Vision and Strategy: Hierarchy and Connectivity (From Conway, 2007) 
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The ongoing theme in USMC Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007) is to constantly 
train (i.e., learn) and innovate to improve core competencies, increase effectiveness and 
efficiency, and sustain a competitive advantage against any adversary. Although USMC 
Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007) lists many goals, the specific strategy statement and 
objectives for 2025 align with what a KM program can manage or can contribute to 
sustaining a competitive advantage. For example, the first objective is to focus on the 
individual Marine by “recruitment, training, professional education, and retention of high 
quality, disciplined warriors imbued with” knowledge, which is paramount to the Marine 
Corps’ mission (Conway, 2007, p. 14).   
The point of mentioning both the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (2010) and 
the USMC Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007) is to illustrate that the Marine Corps and its 
leaders have the right mindset and understand the direction of the future, yet still have not 
fully invested in initiating or understanding the power that KM can provide. This at least 
answers the first proposition that USMC leadership understands that KM in the USMC is 
a critical capital asset for a competitive advantage. There are many other documents that 
illustrate the benefits that a KM program can provide as a capital asset (e.g., 2012 U.S. 
Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan: Leading Edge Technology for the Marines of 
Tomorrow). Additionally, there are numerous all-Marine (ALMAR) messages, Marine 
administrative (MARADMIN) messages, doctrines, publications, Marine Corps orders 
(MCO), bulletins, etc., that allude to promising benefits that the Marine Corps can expect 
from a KM enterprise. There are also official programs that are still ongoing. For 
example, MCO 1553.3B Unit Training Management Program (2011) specifically 
provides a policy for the implementation of the Marine Corps Unit Readiness Planning 
(URP) policy. Additionally, unit training management (UTM) directs standard-based 
training focused on mission-essential tasks (METs) (MCO 1553.3B, 2011). 
Most importantly, MCWP 3–40.2 Information Management (2002) supports the 
current information age. It states,  
Effective information management delivers critically important 
information in a timely manner to those who need it in a form that they 
can quickly understand, … and includes all activities involved in the 
 38
identification, collection, filtering, fusing, processing, focusing, 
dissemination, and usage of information. (MCWP 3–40.2, 2002, p. 1–1) 
Not only is IM for command and control (C2) purposes, MCWP 3–40.2 (2002) 
stresses all types of information to support decision making. Figure 13 illustrates information 
flow through the new information hierarchy figure in draft MCWP 3-40.2 (2013). 
 
Figure 13.  Creating Shared Understanding (From MCWP 3–40.2, 2013) 
The information hierarchy acknowledges that knowledge is a necessity in 
supporting situational awareness and decision making. MCWP 3–40.2 (2013) defines 
knowledge as “the result of analyzing, integrating, and interpreting processed data; it 
brings meaning and value to a situation or event. Simply put, knowledge is a 
representation of what is happening” (p. 1–4). In an effort to manage information, an 
information-management officer (IMO) has the responsibility to ensure personnel of all 
ranks are receiving and distributing quality information throughout the unit (MCWP 3–
40.2, 2002, p. 2–2). The IMO is further tasked with promoting KF as mentioned in 
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MCWP 3–40.2 (2013). This emphasizes that data, information, and knowledge are all 
manageable processes within data management, IM, and KM. 
One of the major units that support these priorities and the direction of the CMC 
is the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC), Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), G3/G5 unit. Their 
mission is to develop the conceptual and operational view of how the Marine Corps 
contributes to the joint forces. This division develops Marine Corps concepts of 
operations (CONOPS) to guide force development (CD&I, 2013). The CD&I’s latest 
initiative was a USMC KM CoP kickoff meeting held on 20 May 2013. The USMC KM 
CoP consists of “representation from each of the HQMC agencies, operating force 
commands, and supporting establishments” (CD&I Slides, 2013, Slide 14), to include 
participants in meetings and discussion forums from other unit KM leads such as 
commanders, leaders, and decision makers. The agenda included strategic drivers, KM 
principles, the USMC KM vision, definition, goals, and value proposition, USMC KM 
CoP objectives, and the integration of both IM and KM (CD&I Slides, 2013). Again, the 
Marine Corps understands the direction of the future, but has not yet initiated a solid KM 
program; however, much ground has been covered in building up a USMC KM CoP over 
the last few years. CD&I also employs a knowledge-management support section with a 
chief knowledge manager (CKM). During the USMC KM CoP kickoff meeting, the 
CKM stressed two important MCIENT objectives that state “the need to institutionalize 
information management and knowledge management practices across the Marine 
Corps,” (Nally, 2010, p. 14) and to evolve the “Corps into a knowledge-based force that 
achieves decision and execution superiority, leverages seamless communications for 
decisive advantage, and extends our Corps’ warfighting preeminence into cyberspace” 
(Nally, 2010, p. 15). The most important and prominent aspect for the Marine Corps’ 
initiation of KM is the adoption of KM principles from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) in Charter of the Knowledge Management Cross-Functional 
Team  (CJCSI 5124.01) (2013). These principles are listed in Table 7. 
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Knowledge Management Principles 
People 
1 Train and educate KM leaders, managers, and champions. 
2 Reward knowledge sharing and make knowledge-management career 
rewarding. 
3 Establish a doctrine of collaboration. 
4 Use every interaction, whether face-to-face or virtual, as an opportunity to 
acquire and share knowledge. 
5 Prevent knowledge loss. 
Process 
6 Protect and secure information and knowledge assets. 
7 Embed knowledge assets (links, podcasts, videos, documents, simulations, 
wikis…) in standard business processes and provide access to those who 
need to know. 
8 Use legal and standard business rules and processes across the enterprise. 
Technology 
9 Use standardized collaborative tool sets. 
10 Use open architecture to permit access and searching across boundaries. 
11 Use a robust search capability to access contextual knowledge and store 
content for discovery. 
12 Use portals that permit single sign-on and authentication across the global 
enterprise, including partners. 
Table 7.   Knowledge Management Principles (After CJCSI 5124.01, 2013) 
The CJCSI released the Charter of the Knowledge Management Cross-Functional 
Team in April 2013. This charter established: 
A governing entity responsible for improving knowledge management 
across the Joint Staff (JS), as well as mentoring and promulgating 
knowledge management best practices across the Services, combatant 
commands, and combat support agencies. In short, it ensures lessons 
learned and best practices filter up and across while strategic guidance 
from the JS guides priority of effort. (CJCSI, 2013, p. 1) 
Two important points are derived from this charters’ purpose: 1) that KM best 
practices should spread across the services, and 2) the priority of effort—an ongoing theme. 
Johnson’s (2010) thesis, Developing a Knowledge Management Framework to Assist With 
Current USMC Information Management Practices, states that, “the Marine Corps, as well 
as DoD, understands well the value of KM, but has a difficult time integrating its practices 
into daily operation” (p. 1). While the DoD and the Marine Corps’ KM CoPs have only 
recently been developed, the other services (i.e., Air Force, Army, and Navy) have put KM 
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into practice within the last few years. Presented again, Table 8 is a summary of each 
service’s KM initiatives, as of a few years ago.  This table not only illustrates what the 
USMC had in the past, it also sets the scene for how far it has gone to create a KM CoP, 
definition, vision, strategy, and principles.  This table emphasizes past programs to reveal 
any pathologies, and to identify in later analysis more recent programs and activities. 
 
 42
 Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy 
Service Level 
Programs 
Data is more than knowledge: 
Implications of the reversed  knowledge 
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Army Knowledge 
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Lessons Learned 
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MCCDC KM CoP 
Naval Education Training 
Command 
Naval Personnel Development 
Command 
U.S. Pacific Fleet 




Data is more than knowledge: 
Implications of the reversed  knowledge 
hierarchy for knowledge management 
and organizational memory 









Under Development CoP Courses (7) 
IPTR: Knowledge 
Distribution, Knowledge Flow, 
and Organizational 
Performance (KM) 
Navy Afloat Knowledge 
Managers Course 
NPS: IS3210 KM in Defense 




Data is more than knowledge: 
Implications of the reversed  knowledge 
hierarchy for knowledge management 





Community of Practice Community of Practice 
Table 8.   DoD KM Initiatives (From Johnson, 2010) 
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A. USMC KM COP DEFINITION, VISION, STRATEGY, AND 
PRINCIPLES 
The USMC KM CoP definition of KM is “the integration of people and processes, 
enabled by technology, to facilitate the exchange of operationally relevant information 
and expertise to increase organizational performance” (CD&I Slides, 2013, Slide 10). 
They add that this definition will be included in the forthcoming MCWP 3.40.2 (2013) 
revision (CD&I Slides, 2013). 
The USMC KM CoP vision is “to develop a Marine Corps enterprise environment 
that promotes leveraging information and knowledge assets, along with a continuous 
learning organization that takes advantage of technology, to effectively share, 
communicate, and collaborate in order to maintain mission readiness” (CD&I Slides, 
2013, Slide 10). The strategic drivers are adopted from the MCIENT Strategy (2010), as 
mentioned previously. The USMC KM CoP has aligned vision and strategy to support the 
CMC’s Planning Guidance (2010) and the USMC’s Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007). 
Currently, organization-wide KM in the Marine Corps has made little advancement by 
creating the fundamentals of any program (i.e., definition, vision, and strategy), and 
emphasizing the priorities of the commandant. The next big piece in the USMC’s KM 
CoP goals is to practice the adopted principles and further develop a mature KM 
enterprise. Table 9 summarizes the USMC’s KM principles and adds an element of 
analysis and support to each. Every USMC KM principle is related to a corresponding 
principle from Nissen (2006) to either augment or provide clarity. It is important to 
understand that Nissen’s (2006) principles are derived from years of research, connecting 
the theories of many KM practitioners to establish concise, relevant, and the most up-to-
date principles for application. The USMC KM principles themselves are being critiqued, 
not the application or practice of the principles, because the USMC has yet to establish a 
coordinated KM initiative throughout its major and subordinate units. When revised 
MCWP 3–40.2 (2013) is released and the KM CoP expands throughout the USMC, then 




Analysis of USMC KM Principles 
People 
1 Train and educate KM leaders, managers, and champions. 
“15. Managerial efficacy through intervention can be increased by learning the 
principles of dynamic knowledge.” 
2 Reward knowledge sharing and make knowledge-management career 
rewarding. 
“23. The impact of KM increases in direct proportion to the reach of knowledge 
flows through an organization.” 
3 Establish a doctrine of collaboration. 
“5. The four organizational elements of personnel, work processes, structure, and 
technology operate as a cohesive system and should be addressed as an integrated 
design problem.” 
4 Use every interaction, whether face-to-face or virtual, as an opportunity to 
acquire and share knowledge. 
“11. Knowledge-flow processes represent direct focuses of leadership and 
managerial action.” 
5 Prevent knowledge loss. 
“21. Knowledge must be put to use through action in order to be useful.” 
Process 
6 Protect and secure information and knowledge assets. 
“18. Most IT plays a supportive role in the organization, whereas people play most 
of the performative roles.” 
7 Embed knowledge assets (links, podcasts, videos, documents, simulations, 
wikis…) in standard business processes and provide access to those who need 
to know. 
“1. Shuttling information around via computers, networks, reports, and 
communications does not address the flow of knowledge, at least not directly or on 
the same time scale.” 
8 Use legal and standard business rules and processes across the enterprise. 
“13. Knowledge-flows should be planned and managed like workflows.” 
Technology 
9 Use standardized collaborative tool sets. 
“16. The manager needs to employ non-technical interventions to enhance 
knowledge flows.” 
10 Use Open Architecture to permit access and searching across boundaries. 
“12. Changes to workflows demand changes to knowledge flows, and vice versa.” 
11 Use a robust search capability to access contextual knowledge and store 
content for discovery. 
“10. The nature of knowledge represents a critical factor for determining where IT 
can be expected to enhance knowledge flows.” 
12 Use portals that permit single sign-on and authentication across the global 
enterprise including partners. 
“19.  ‘Intelligent’ applications can play a performative role in the organization.” 
Table 9.   Analysis of USMC KM Principles 
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Most doctrine in the USMC serves as a standard operating procedure or addresses 
what must be known to take action. Nissen’s (2006) research supporting the KM 
principles above serves as a valuable SOP—especially in the USMC’s initiative to get 
KM off the ground and implemented throughout all subordinate units. The doctrine 
currently in use is MCWP 3–40.2 (2002); however, the update to include KM has not 
been approved for release.   Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) “is responsible for 
coordinating the development and execution of service plans and policies related to the 
structure, deployment, and employment of Marine Corps forces in general” (PP&O, 
2013, Mission), and they do not perceive knowledge as manageable. In this case, it would 
be better for USMC units to understand how to harness knowledge rather than manage it. 
This is an extremely important concept to understand. Much like the wind, organizational 
success is obtained through harnessing knowledge where managing it is impossible.  In 
answering the second proposition, harnessing the dynamics of knowledge can prove to 
support any strategic, operational, or tactical discipline.  Harnessing knowledge should be 
evident and the updated doctrine should not be stalled, because knowledge is power.  It 
has not been determined exactly what PP&O’s opinions and justification are for not 
releasing the new MCWP 3–40.2 (2013); nevertheless, the USMC KM CoP is still 
continuing to pursue and follow the guidance set forth by the CMC’s Planning Guidance 
(2010) and the USMC’s Vision and Strategy 2025 (2007).  “Knowledge is more 
actionable (i.e., can be better managed) than information or data is, but actionability does 
not imply a separate judgment such as better” (Nissen, 2006, p. 20). This issue brings to 
light a leadership problem, thereby formulating our first mandate: 
 Leadership Mandate 1: USMC KM must have a centralized vision 
across the whole organization, with decentralized execution.  
As evidenced in the other armed services, KM is manageable. The Air Force, 
Army, and Navy all have matured over the last few years in KM, while the USMC’s KM 
has not made it explicitly into daily operations. An important principle has been derived 
from this problem, which includes people and processes: 
 Organizations must be willing to adopt business process re-
engineering and change-management processes to increase or sustain 
a competitive advantage. 
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In any business process re-engineering (BPR) and change-management process, 
there will always be preconditions for success and failure. This is because there may be 
“(1) lack or sustained management commitment and leadership; (2) unrealistic scope and 
expectations; and (3) resistance to change” (Nissen, 2006, p. 94). Again, these three 
obstacles seem to keep the USMC from attempting to initiate KM through BPR and 
change-management processes; however, (presented in Table 10) the USMC Knowledge 
Management Community of Practice Charter (2013) has identified six specific goals to 
achieve, and to further expand a USMC KM enterprise. 
USMC KM CoP Goals 
1 Enable, sustain, and institutionalize information and knowledge sharing across the Marine 
Corps.
2 Develop open communities where people may question, learn, and collaborate in a manner 
that builds organizational expertise and fosters individual growth. 
3 Advocate and support information and knowledge sharing to increase operational efficiency 
and effectiveness, and enhance planning and decision-making processes across the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of command.
4 Develop processes, procedures, and standards that best enable the capture, sharing, and 
maintenance of relevant and timely information and knowledge assets. 
5 Create, capture, store, and share  information and knowledge assets in a manner that 
provides accurate and actionable information for commanders, planners, and decision 
makers, on demand. 
6 Identify and leverage standard, interoperable internet-based capabilities that best enable 
secure collaboration and information and knowledge sharing across USMC and DoD 
information enterprises. 
Table 10.   USMC KM CoP Goals (After USMC KM CoP Charter, 2013) 
B. CURRENT USMC KM INITIATIVES 
Johnson’s (2010) research and analysis identified that, three years ago, the USMC 
was at a maturity level two in their quest towards implementing KM initiatives.  Today, 
the USMC can be seen at a maturity level of three from Minonne and Turner’s (2009) 
Evaluation of Knowledge Management Performance. This maturity level indicates the 
USMC has progressed, but still trails the other services towards an organization-wide 
KM CoP. Again, the driving force for the successful maturation of the USMC’s KM CoP 
and program(s) is the MCCDC, G3-G5, CD&I, Office of Knowledge Management. 
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Minonne and Turner’s (2009) stages of implementation and control maturity level three 
states, “An advance level of cultural integration and an intermediate level of 
organizational integration have been achieved. Only a low level of methodical integration 
is in place and no meaningful procedural integration is yet established” (p. 587). The 
level of organizational control is “mainly qualitative, but some quantitative KPIs [key 
performance indicators] developed to monitor efficiency and some qualitative KPIs to 
assess effectiveness in the implementation of KM strategy” (Minonne and Turner, 2009, 
p. 587). Basically, Minonne and Turner’s (2009) maturity/stage level three signifies: 
Appropriate personnel and monetary resources are made available for 
current activities and firmly committed for future developments in KM. 
Knowledge innovation (“I” of EIDA, see Minonne 2007) is supported and 
actively promoted. This fosters increasing effectiveness by leading to new 
ideas, combinations or new applications and thus puts in place a 
foundation for the development of new products or services. (p. 587) 
The products and services that are currently supporting the USMC’s KM CoP and 
initiatives are plentiful; however, they are not currently labeled as specific KM 
capabilities. Additionally, many commands are at a high KM maturity level with strong 
CoPs in place (e.g., IMEF, TECOM, MARSOC, MARFORRES, just to name a few), but 
lack coordination for an overall effective KM enterprise.  This signifies that the USMC’s 
KM program is progressively gaining strength, and KM is becoming the norm among 
many units; however, the latest KM tasks and initiatives tracker (see Figure 14, below) 
was last updated on 5 December 2012, indicating the last event was the third USMC KM 
CoP Quarterly Meeting in July 2013.  Additionally, the USMC’s KM way ahead in 2010 
is indicated in Figure 15.  Compared to its current 2013 way ahead in there is no current 
or updated project tracker; however, as a result of the USMC’s KM maturity, CD&I, 
Office of Knowledge Management Support verified the following are the most recent 
enterprise-facing KM actions and milestones to date: 
 Development and release of the USMC KM CoP Charter 
 Subsequent conduct of quarterly meetings and webinars 
 Release of the Joint KM Charter and USMC’s strategic alignment 
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 Development and inclusion of the USMC’s official KM definition and 
terminology in the USMC doctrine 
 Final stages of publishing and release of USMC KM doctrine 
 Strategic partnership with Training and Education Command (TECOM) 
and enterprise stakeholders to develop USMC KM leadership staff tasks, 
activities, and knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) 
These actions and milestones are significant in proving the slow progression but 
higher level of maturity for the USMC’s KM program. The units/services identified 
below are only the most readily identified contributors toward increasing the USMC’s 
KM maturity level.  Once a thorough operating model and campaign plan are established, 




Figure 14.  USMC KM Tasks and Initiatives (From USMC KM, 2013, Tracker)
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Figure 15.  USMC’s KM Way Ahead 2010 (From Johnson, 2010) 
1. Marine Corps Enterprise Services 
A large part of fulfilling the USMC KM CoP definition of KM is currently being 
accomplished through the Marine Corps Enterprise Services (MCES), previously named 
Marine Corps Enterprise Information Technology Services (MCEITS) subpart of Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC). The latest initiatives by MCSC have shown a 
dramatic increase in KM practices by serving the “Department of the Navy’s systems 
command for Marine Corps ground weapon and information technology system programs 
in order to equip and sustain Marine forces with full-spectrum, current and future 
expeditionary and crisis response capabilities” (MCSC, 2013, Command Mission).  
Under the command overview and history, MCSC further states that they implement the 
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most effective and efficient business processes, while both civilian and active duty 
Marines learn, research, and test any system or piece of equipment that contributes to the 
warfighter’s mission accomplishment (MCSC, 2013).  Through their framework (Figure 
14 and 15) MCEITS is the main “provider of enterprise IT services, service support, and 
the infrastructure necessary to enable a secure collaborative, interoperable” information 
and knowledge sharing environment (MCES, 2013, Support). MCES is a perfect example 
of a supporting unit/system that has aligned its mission to meet the priorities, vision, and 
strategy of the CMC, DoD, and POTUS in enabling a knowledge-based organization and 
culture. Not only does MCEITS help accomplish the goals of the USMC’s KM CoP 
Charter, their end-user services of MCEITS Marine Corps Portal (i.e., eUSMC portal), 
asynchronous collaboration, and workflow services provide capabilities to support day-
to-day operations, aligning with USMC KM principles 4 (people), 6 & 7 (process), and 
12 (technology) as seen below and in figures 16 and 17: 
The eUSMC portal will provide the opportunity to customize and 
personalize an online environment with information from different 
systems and services most critical to a user's role. This interface will be 
similar to the iGoogle and myYahoo portal concept. It will serve as an 
integrated information workplace. (MCES, 2013, MCEITS Portal and 
Web Services) 
The Asynchronous Collaboration Services will provide a central storage 
and workspace allowing teams and organizations to exchange information 
non-simultaneously under the MCEITS enterprise portal umbrella. This 
will seamlessly integrate with the single sign-on services within the 
MCEITS environment. (MCES, 2013, MCEITS Portal and Web Services) 
The Workflow Services will provide a mechanism to automate tasks and 
will incorporate human tasks as well as information service tasks. This 
will include a management interface that allows for the administration of 
the designed workflow processes. The Text-Based Chat Services will 
provide an enterprise wide chat capability that seamlessly integrates with 
the eUSMC portal environment, and will incorporate the same interface 
look and feel. (MCES, 2013, MCEITS Portal and Web Services) 
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Figure 16.  MCEITS Organizational Relationship (From MCES, 2013) 
 
Figure 17.  MCEITS Framework (From MCES, 2013) 
2. Training and Education Command 
Another major advance in the USMC’s KM initiatives is through the USMC 
TECOM’s Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS). 
TECOM’s mission is “to develop, coordinate, resource, execute, and evaluate training 
and education concepts, policies, plans, and programs to ensure Marines are prepared to 
meet the challenges of present and future operational environments” (TECOM, 2013, 
Mission). TECOM has literally over a hundred subordinate units worldwide 
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(for an organizational chart see http://www.tecom.marines.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket 
=AbtBoYIIYqg%3d&tabid=8217&portalid=90), and is another USMC-wide supporting unit that 
has aligned its mission to meet the priorities, vision, and strategy of the CMC, DoD, and 
POTUS in enabling a knowledge-based organization and culture. MCTIMS is a training 
and readiness (T&R) manual module designed to capture individual and collective unit-
training standards for an occupational field and military occupational specialty (MOS). 
These training standards are used by the selected schoolhouse and the Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF) as the basis for training throughout the USMC. The functional manager for 
MCTIMS modules is Training Management and Evaluation Branch (TMEB). TMEB 
basically oversees “T&R manual development, curriculum management and 
development, student evaluation, individual training management, electronic training 
jacket, and unit training management” (TECOM, 2013, Ground Training Division). 
Essentially, the majority of TMEB’s responsibilities lie within the realm of KM. What 
they do not necessary have is a KM program. With TECOM’s current efforts, KM CoPs 
in the USMC can grow and develop thorough KM programs. Currently TECOM’s 
strategy mirrors the same principles as MCEITS: 4 (people), 6 & 7 (process), and 12 
(technology). MCTIMS is another great example of a supporting unit/system that has 
aligned its mission to meet the priorities, vision, and strategy of the CMC, DoD, and 
POTUS in enabling a knowledge-based organization and culture. Evidence illustrates that 
TECOM’s subordinate units, programs, and systems help support the USMC’s KM CoPs 
in achieving their goals. This also supports the current maturity level of KM in the 
USMC. When a true USMC-wide KM enterprise matures, it should be the result of 
TECOM coordinating with MCES and engaging/interacting with every unit in the USMC 
to enhance KFs.  Both are well on their way. For example, TECOM already has a KM 
Officer (KMO) at G-3, and a KM analyst at Operations Directorate, Marine Corps 
Communication Electronics School. Table 11 is a consolidation of current USMC KM 
initiatives (but not limited to). 
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Table 11.   Current USMC KM Initiatives 
C. SMALL UNIT ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of this analysis, small units in the USMC are considered any 
major subordinate command (MSC) and lower (e.g., divisions, regiments, battalions, 
companies, platoons, and squads). Although most will consider a division to be a large 
unit, KM at MSCs and lower may be similarly structured from the USMC’s hierarchal 
operational and tactical structure. Many smaller units in the USMC are at a maturity-level 
four in Minonne and Turner’ (2009) stages of implementation and control. The ongoing 
trends are knowledge-based Sharepoint, portal, and web-service establishments and use 
among USMC MSCs interacting and integrating with one another on an intermediate 
level. Additionally, the USMC has a well-established program in place that can 
contribute greatly towards increasing KM initiatives throughout MSCs and below. The 
unit-training management (UTM) program and the utilization of the systems approach to 
training and education (SATE) process in all USMC formal schools and by units within 
the operating forces can contribute greatly towards an individual unit’s KM program and 
KF in general. 
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1. Marine Force Reserve KM Program 
One major MSC is Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MFR) Headquarters. After a 
recent visit by the author from the Naval Postgraduate School, but not as an official 
evaluation, MFR may be seen at a higher maturity stage of four. Minonne and Turner’s 
(2009) Evaluation of Knowledge Management Performance states the level of 
implementation is “an advanced level of cultural and organizational integration as well as 
an intermediate level of methodical and procedural integration,” and the level of control 
is “qualitative and quantitative KPIs in place to monitor the implementation of an 
effective and efficient KM strategy to take the organization in the direction of its 
perceived future image” (p. 587). Maturity in the MFR is evident throughout, especially 
after their assessment from an experienced KM consulting firm. One major method MFR 
uses to achieve a higher degree of maturity is their advanced decision-making 
framework, presented in Figure 18.  This framework is an advanced addition to Johnson’s 
framework presented in his 2010 case study; however, the C-3PO KM framework still 
provides a theoretical methodology to guide the development of a strong KM program 
within any unit. MFR adds an advanced aspect of social interaction in decision-making 
processes to their KM framework. 
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Figure 18.  MFR Decision-Making Framework (From McGuiness, 2013a) 
MFR’s principles (Table 12) and goals (Table 13) are even more advanced than 
the USMC KM principles.  As seen below, MFR’s principles are directed more towards 
the process of their KM program rather than the basics of USMC KM principles.  
Additionally, their goals present a focus upon specific KM-related tasks to improve in 
and expand the awareness of IM and KM.  All MFR’s KM principles and goals are 
centered on their strategy that, 
Information does not manage itself, and Knowledge is neither created nor 
transferred by accident.  A successful organization develops the culture 
and processes to ensure that the right information is available for people at 
all levels to make the best decisions.  A coordinated strategy that seeks to 
reduce the cost, complexity and integration difficulties of sharing and 
exchanging information and knowledge is essential to developing this 
culture.  Information Management and Knowledge Management are keys 
to MARFORRES’ ability to support the Marine Reserve Component 
particularly in the impending lean fiscal environment.  This first ever, 
MFR IM/KM Campaign Plan provides the roadmap to adding this critical 




MFR Knowledge Management Principles 
1 KM is a deliberate approach to help organizations effectively use and re-use what they know 
(tact and explicit) to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. 
2 KM is socially driven, linking people across the organizational boundaries to share what 
they know.
3 KM is about finding experts, connecting people and solving problems more effectively.
4 KM connects the act of leadership and intuition to the science of management and control.
5 KM provides a disciplined approach and a set of tools to what would otherwise be 
happenstance. 
6 KM is a holistic approach that covers everything from creating new knowledge to managing 
documents and records. 
7 KM is connecting people to share what they know. 
8 KM is focused on moving actionable knowledge from people to people, not storing 
information and data in large repositories. 
9 KM KM must be aligned with an organization’s performance goals and objectives.  It helps 
us do our jobs better, to improve our capacity to act, (i.e., to make decisions). 
Table 12.   MFR Knowledge Management Principles (After McGuiness, 2013a) 
 
MFR Knowledge Management Goals 
1 Increase KM education, training, awareness, and understanding throughout MFR 
Headquarters and throughout the Force. 
2 Develop a user-participative MFR KM training and assessment program/plan. 
3 Develop a CMFR KM Evaluation/Endorsement Component to the MFR KM Strategy. 
4 Accomplish the following KM- Based Projects: 
(1) ‘On Boarding’ - Assess and enhance the MFR ‘On Boarding’ Processes at both the 
Headquarters and at the I&I levels.  Integrate all existing on-boarding components and 
determine/implement improvements.  Perform similar assessment for ‘Off  Boarding.’ 
(2) ‘Business Governance’ - Develop a KM Business Governance in concert with existing 
practices and procedures to clearly articulate the purposes and uses of the following: 
CMFR Landing Page, Battle Rhythm/Staff  Management Pages, Command Dashboards, 
Command Task Management Systems/Tools, Email, Discussion Forums, Chat/Jabber, 
Wikis, SharePoint, Staff meetings, Business Process Management , Content Management 
5 Link the MFR KM effort with the Marine Corps IM/KM effort. 
Table 13.   MFR Knowledge Management Goals (After McGuiness, 2013a) 
The MFR is one of many MSCs that have advanced or developed a KM CoP to 
maturity levels higher than that of HQMC’s organization-wide KM program.  
Furthermore, during a more broad analysis, many MSCs and subordinate units were 
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unconsciously practicing the process and technology principles of KM; and at an 
individual level, a large part of a Marine’s daily duties or responsibilities is focusing on 
training and education.  It has always been part of the esprit de corps that a Marine’s job 
is to train when not directly involved in a firefight.  Training and educating on a daily 
basis calls for an extensive program that not only has standards for “brilliance in the 
basics,” but requires sustainment training. Sustainment training contributes directly to the 
gain of tacit knowledge. The USMC’s mature training programs tie directly into the 
USMC’s KM program. 
2. Unit-Training Management and Systems Approach to Training and 
Education 
The USMC needs to capitalize on the well-established UTM program and the 
SATE process to increase its maturity in an organization-wide KM enterprise. All key 
personnel in all military specialties are responsible for maintaining their own codified 
knowledge, per many MCOs required for training and learning. UTM programs are 
directed by MCO 1553.3B, which requires unit commanders to “develop and execute 
training plans focused on their respectively approved Mission Essential Task List 
(METL). …. with input and assistance from Training and Education Command and the 
Marine Forces” (MCO 1553.3B, 2011, p. 2).  Basically, a METL includes tasks required 
for training Marines to accomplish the mission.  More emphatically, the Commanding 
General, MCCDC “advises and guides Marine Corps commanders of the operating forces 
and supporting establishment in all matters related to training and education” (MCO 
1553.3B, 2011, p. 2).  This is important because as illustrated in Figure 16, MCCDC is 
part of MCEITS’s organizational relationship. 
UTM is responsible for several areas of training, especially in Marine Corps 
common skills (MCCS) and individual MOS training standards (ITS). A large part of 
training is accomplished through MarineNet courses.  Again, UTM directly ties into KFs 
of explicit and tacit knowledge within a unit.  There are many references and much 
codified knowledge in regard to a unit’s UTM (e.g., MCOs, Publications, T&R manuals, 
and checklists). Most of the codified knowledge was captured from the tacit knowledge 
gained by Marines over decades of service, and KF throughout the USMC is directly tied 
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into the military’s organizational group structure (e.g., divisions, regiments, battalions, 
companies, platoons, squads, fireteams, and special teams/groups).  Ideally, the 
organizational group structure of the USMC supports the framework and principles of 
UTM programs.  A majority of these principles (listed in Table 14) can be tied to the 
transfer of knowledge from individual to individual or from group to group—even more 
reason to tie people, processes, and technology together under a USMC KM enterprise 
architecture of coordination with high integration and flexibility at all MSCs and below. 
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Marine Corps Training Priciples 
1 Train as you fight.
2 Make commanders responsible for training.
3 Use standards-based training.
4 Use performance-oriented training.
5 Use mission-oriented training. 
6 Train the MAGTF to fight as a comined-arms team. 
7 Train the MAGTF to fight as part of a Joint Force.
8 Train to sustain proficiency. 
9 Train to challenge. 
10 Integrate values based training and leadership. 
Table 14.   Marine Corps Training Principles (After MCO 1553.3B, 2011) 
Among the many components of the USMC’s UTM program, the SATE process 
provides commanders with a framework to plan and conduct training.  Following the 
SATE process ensures that “Marines acquire the knowledge and skills essential for 
successful job performance both as individuals and as a unit in the performance of all 
[missions]” (MCO 1553.3B, 2011, p. 2-1).  The SATE framework comprises five phases: 
analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate.  This is similar to Nissen’s (2006) 
knowledge life-cycle to create, organize, formalize, share, apply, and refine.  Looking at 
Nissen’s (2006) MDKFV in Figure 19, one can see similarities of concepts along the Z 
axis (i.e., life-cycle). 
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Figure 19.  MDKFV and SATE (After Nissen, 2005) 
With UTM and SATE, knowledge does flow through a systematic process of 
Nonaka’s (1991) SECI model; however, the problems arise through the transfer of tacit 
knowledge because it is “sticky, difficult to imitate, and slow to move” (Nissen, 2006, p. 
13). Within a unit’s training program, knowledge clumps must be identified so KF can 
occur more fluidly.  The USMC’s UTM program and SATE process have all the signs 
that an implementation of a KM program will evolve and drastically improve the flow of 
knowledge, thus increasing training and education for every Marine; however, there is no 
real use of knowledge technology throughout the MSCs to increase KF.  For example, 
Polania’s (2010) thesis on Leveraging Social Networking Technologies: an Analysis of 
the Knowledge Flows Facilitated by Social Media and the Potential Improvements in 
Situational Awareness, Readiness, and Productivity indicates that the USMC can adapt 
and take advantage of social media to increase KFs.  By now, there should be a 
visualization that illustrates the need for a relationship between UTM/SATE, MCEITS, 
MCTIMS, and social media under the umbrella of KM.  Figure 20 provides a simple 
visualization of a USMC KM enterprise’s interactions and integration.  Of course, the 
whole realm of KM components can expand this diagram dramatically.   
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Beyond the scope of IM, KM leverages the collective human, intellectual, 
social and structural capitals to create knowledge-based organizations, 
aimed at accomplishing organizational goals and missions while 
sustaining a dynamic strategic advantage, across the Marine Corps 
(MCWP 3-40.2 Draft, 2013, p. 15). 
 
Figure 20.  USMC KM Enterprise Interactions and Integration 
D. PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
Many preconditions for success are present throughout the Marine Corps, 
indicating that the practice of KM will give the organization a competitive advantage. 
Table 15 summarizes the preconditions for success. 
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Table 15.   Preconditions for Success (From Nissen, 2006 & Bashein et al., 1994) 
All preconditions for success are evident within the USMC except one and five. 
Clearly, not all leaders are onboard for the substantial change involved in adapting KM 
practices throughout the Corps. It is not that leaders will not follow the KM direction for 
future success; they are not fully informed about the potential KM offers for competitive 
advantage.  Additionally, the vision of KM needs to be conceived and empowered by all. 
For example, KM must be incorporated into everyday tasks, senior-management support, 
and employee training (Nissen, 2006 and Jennex & Olfman, 2004). The implementation 
of KM throughout the USMC is a realistic expectation, as the current USMC KM CoP 
has done much to develop the required supporting doctrine and follow a framework for 
success. With commanders understanding the potential KM has to offer their units 
towards a competitive advantage, enthusiasm for this potential is inevitable, for it will 
cause growth and expansion.  The USMC’s task organization clearly illustrates it obtains 
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sound management processes to pursue the change needed for KM implementation and 
maturity.  Additionally, the USMC has the motivation and dedication for the successful 
change, along with the funding necessary to adapt new practices and required 
technologies. 
E. PRECONDITIONS FOR FAILURE 
 
Table 16.   Preconditions for Failure (From Nissen, 2006 & Bashein et al., 1994) 
Precondition 15 seems to be the most prevalent within the Marine Corps. The 
operational tempo in the USMC is a speeding locomotive. Many organizations are 
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reactive vice proactive, which is always considered a recipe for disaster. This could be 
the aftereffect of too many projects under way.  Developing priorities of work and sound 
time-management practices must always be the fundamentals of managing tasks and 
change. As mentioned, the adoption of KM is a substantial and significant change that 
must occur for the Marine Corps to continue excelling in warfighting; however, people 
are resistant to change and do not want to work harder than they are already to implement 
a new practice. Attention needs to be drawn to Nissen’s (2006) fifth principle—”the four 
organizational elements of personnel, work processes, structure, and technology operate 
as a cohesive system and should be addressed as an integrated design problem” (p. 14)—
and the new principle derived from leadership mandates. Again, an ongoing theme of 
successful KM includes an enterprise of people, processes, and technologies. Working 
together as a cohesive organization will bring together the necessary requirements for 
successful change. With components of UTM, SATE, MCEITS, MCTIMS, and other 
KM-supporting technologies, organization-wide KM in the USMC is well on its way to 
the next maturity level. Seeing MFR’s accomplishments and other KM CoPs located at 
MSCs and below will prove KM’s advantages and successes. 
Nissen (2006) points out that Jennex and Olfman (2004) have identified other 
factors for success, such as “incorporation of KM into everyday work tasks, senior 
management support, and employee training” (p. 98). Both the factors of success and 
failure from Bashein, Markus and Riley (1994) did not mention the importance of an 
SOP. While there is an update to MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) waiting to be signed, there is still 
no official USMC SOP for the practice of KM at MSCs and below.  In answering 
proposition three, KM will mature in the USMC through the acceptance and direction of 
an SOP and CoPs at both headquarters and small-unit levels. For example, relevant 
literature such as Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: Principled Organizational Knowing 
and Learning (Nissen, 2006) can serve as a SOP for units to begin creating “brilliance in 
the basics.”  As clichéd as the phrase has become, “brilliance in the basics” still proves to 
be a strong methodology for commencing and improving any skill set or program. This 
leads to a second mandate: 
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 Leadership Mandate 2: Principles and standard operating procedures 
serve as a basis for learning and doing and may always be improved 
upon for refinement. 
So far, this analysis has illustrated that the Marine Corps has made solid 
groundwork in following a framework (e.g., vision, strategy, principles) for the practice 
of KM at the HQ level, and senior leaders and managers have shown the fortitude for 
successful change. Once the Marine Corps’ KM program is actually initiated across HQ 
level units, a more thorough analysis can be conducted to assess more conditions for 
success and failure, maturity levels, and specific knowledge assessments. For example, 
Nissen’s (2006) knowledge assessments are proven tools for knowledge managers to 
obtain a more thorough analysis of each KM program. Assessing KF performance can be 
conducted through the BPR approach, as conducted above through preconditions of 
success.  There are many approaches for assessment, but the most prominent are 
knowledge audits, knowledge-value added (KVA), learning curves, and KF 
computational modeling (Nissen, 2006). All these methods add either a theoretical or 
practical perspective to a KM assessment.  There are also well-known firms that exercise 
experienced KM assessments.  One such firm was “instrumental in establishing the first 
knowledge-management program for the U.S. Army and helped build a network of 
communities of practice with over 250,000 members” (SKS, 2013, About Us). It is 
recommended that a consulting firm be brought in for their expertise and to obtain a 
detailed assessment for substantial KM growth.   
Finally, the most substantial goal of the USMC KM CoP will be the release of an 
updated MCWP 3-40.2 (2013), which is currently still a draft waiting to be processed by 
PP&O. Draft MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) provides thorough detail as to why KM is important 
to any organization. Figure 21 illustrates the importance of KM, which is preached and 
stressed by leaders from the POTUS down to the CMC and unit commanders. 
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Figure 21.  Importance of KM (From MCWP 3-40.2 Draft, 2013
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V. CONCLUSION 
This research set out to identify current COAs the USMC is taking to mature its 
KM, diagnose any pathologies preventing USMC units from capitalizing on the power of 
KM, and identify a framework for small-unit-level implementation. The main finding 
was that the Marine Corps has no large-scale pathology preventing organization-wide 
KM initiatives and an increase in CoPs throughout. The main contribution to the increase 
in USMC KM maturity is the spread and implementation of KM CoPs throughout MSCs 
and supporting commands. This illustrates that not only does HQMC have a framework 
already in place, but the practice and maturity of KM in other units demonstrates and 
proves the existence of a framework similar to Johnson’s C-3PO. The only speed bump 
identified is PP&O’s delay in signing off on the new, updated MCWP 3-40.2 (2013). 
Overall, it is clear that most of the leadership in the USMC is onboard for sustaining a 
competitive advantage, making every facet of knowledge a priority, and connecting every 
Marine, Marine Corps affiliate, contracting service, and adjacent agency to information 
and knowledge flow. This is directly in line with the intentions of the POTUS, CJCS, 
DoD CIO, DoN CIO, CMC and others. Below are key results and insights from this case 
study, with recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
A. KEY RESULTS AND INSIGHTS 
The higher maturity level attained of three is a direct result of the USMC KM 
CoPs, which are currently the main driving force for the majority of KM initiatives.  
Referencing Johnson’s (2010) C-3PO framework, it is evident that the USMC KM CoP 
has a clear vision and strategy. Where the initiatives lag is in choosing KM activities in 
conjunction with remote knowledge sharing and organizing KM processes around a 
strategy. For example, it is evident from the analysis that there is no strong integration of 
USMC KM initiatives among HQMC supporting units (e.g., TECOM, MCES, MCCDC, 
PP&O, and MCSC, to name a few), and all MSCs and below. Each unit maintains its own 
structure for KF (e.g., Sharepoint). Back in 2010, Johnson noted that the indicators and 
factors of success “are largely representative of knowledge-flow processes and activities 
 69
that, along with the appropriate KM principles, senior leadership as well as KM 
practitioners, are actively figuring out how to successfully weave [integrate KM] into the 
cultures and operational practices” of each service (Johnson, 2010, p. 58).  The same 
cannot be truer for the integration of KM processes, people, and technologies within and 
throughout all units in the USMC. Finally, this research focuses on initiatives to expand 
the practice of KM in the USMC and not on specific KF processes at the HQ and MSC 
level. Table 17 is a snapshot that summarizes the USMC KM initiatives and practices 
revealed by this research. 
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KM Marine Corps (2010) 
Marine Corps 
(2013) MSCs (2013) 
Vision Yes Yes Yes 
Goals No Yes Yes 
Strategy No Yes Yes 
Principles No Yes Yes 
Framework For 
Implementation No Yes Adopted 







































Maturity Level Novice Maturity Level 3 Maturity Level >3 
Assessment No No Yes 
Future Campaign No No Yes 
Indicators and Factors 
of Success 






















-Strategic context of 




Table 17.   USMC KM Findings 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author’s recommendations focus on the three major components of IM and 
KM: people, processes, and technologies.  Affirming that the USMC has and will 
continue to mature in its KM CoPs and initiatives, the following are simple but 
significant recommendations based upon case-study findings. 
First and foremost, MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) should be approved for release and 
distributed immediately throughout the USMC. Not only does MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) 
cover IM capabilities, it includes a major addition on KM capabilities that covers most of 
the information in the literature review, plus specific capabilities and components for 
conducting KM. MCWP 3-40.2 serves as the principle doctrine expanding upon MCDP 
6, Command and Control.  
Second, the USMC needs a solid SOP for KM leading participants within a unit. 
While MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) enhances the reader’s knowledge of KM and its relationship 
to IM, another publication or SOP needs to serve as the cornerstone for thoroughly 
defined KM principles, understanding of knowledge uniqueness, KFs, knowledge 
learning, knowledge doing, and knowledge assessment. The product of many years’ 
experience and research, Nissen’s (2006) Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: Principled 
Organizational Learning and Doing would serve as an excellent SOP for commanders, 
all staff (i.e., operation, intelligence, communication, logistics, and administration 
officers), section heads, and most emphatically KM billet holders. This text conveys the 
essentials concerning the power of knowledge. It is required reading for the KM course 
offered at the Naval Postgraduate School and part of the KM certificate program. 
Because CD&I and other agencies coordinate KM training and seminars, it would be 
prudent to add Nissen (2006) to any required KM reading material. 
Clearly, the hierarchal structure of the USMC creates an atmosphere for instant 
obedience to orders. As the practice of KM in the USMC expands, so does all KM within 
subordinate units. Besides securing an updated MCWP and an essential KM SOP, the 
next step for most of the USMC is to develop specific campaign plans for following 
Johnson’s (2010) C-3PO framework on choosing KM activities.  As evident in the 
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literature review and analysis, the USMC already has a well-established vision and 
strategy.  A next step in choosing KM activities calls for conducting knowledge audits, 
SWOT analysis, KM education, KM toolkits, and supportive technologies. Having a 
detailed campaign plan with specific KM goals will drastically support KM CoPs and 
expand KM unit awareness, initiatives, and technologies. The interaction and integration 
of all KM components and capabilities increases KFs. 
Following Johnson’s (2010) C-3PO framework is also essential, especially if 
standardized across all USMC units. As discussed in this thesis, the C-3PO framework 
supports a unit’s KM maturity level.  For example, after adopting or creating a vision and 
strategy, units can immediately obtain a thorough KM assessment. This in turn, provides 
structure for ascertaining the requirements of a solid KM campaign plan and goals to 
shoot for.  Standardization and integration across the USMC appear key to keeping the 
traditions of unity of command, and for this, keeping a successful KM framework is a 
must.  Within the framework, the value obtained from a KM assessment cannot be 
overstated, as evidenced by MFR, who use SKS and currently have a solid KM campaign 
plan and goals. 
Another part of the C-3PO framework’s KM activities is KM education. 
Education is another important recommendation of this thesis, and part of the rationale 
for having MCWP 3-40.2 (2013) approved for distribution. In addition to study of 
Nissen’s (2006) Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: Principled Organizational Learning 
and Doing and other training and seminars, KM education in the USMC needs to expand 
to courses offered and implemented through MarineNet.USMC.mil. Creating KFs for 
KM education will exponentially increase the USMC’s KM CoPs overall competitive 
advantage. 
As a final recommendation, KM in the USMC can be presented as an enterprise, 
which needs a KM operating model for organization-wide standardization and 
integration.  On a very simple scale, a KM enterprise would combine the efforts of all 
units to support people, processes, and technology. For example, the KM umbrella (i.e., 
enterprise) would include coordination and collaboration from Marine Corps Network 
Operations and Security Center (MCNOSC), MCSC, MCES, TECOM initiatives (i.e., 
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MCTIMS, UTM, SATE), and external factors such as social media. Of course, such an 
enterprise would expand to all services, contracting agencies, and other outside agencies. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Promising capabilities are available for enhancing KFs by integrating and 
harnessing units throughout a KM enterprise framework.  Expanding upon Johnson’s 
(2010) C-3PO framework for incentives, collaboration, and strategies that facilitate 
knowledge transfer and growth will create a KM enterprise that integrates and 
coordinates all KM-supporting capabilities in the USMC. 
An important part of the expansion of USMC KM initiatives comes from KM 
CoPs expanding to subordinate command. A MSC like MFR is quite mature in its KM 
initiatives and seeks new innovative capabilities to expanding its KFs. The MFR is 
unique in its organizational structure, comprising the Selected Marine Corps Reserve 
(SMCR) national facilities, and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Marines located 
throughout the U.S. In an effort to keep the SMCR Marines ready to augment in time of 
war, the MFR must take great measures in personnel accountability, including medical 
readiness and completeness of required training standards. Since reserve Marines and 
sailors are located essentially everywhere, delivering effective training to transfer both 
explicit and tacit knowledge is a huge challenge. One method that interests the MFR is 
distance learning, to include virtual and social media. 
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